Commodity values also reflect the materialization of memory. Oral discourse gives way to printed histories, memorial monuments, and other material evocations of the past. Collective memories get consigned to history books, museums, commemorative occasions, and preserved precincts. We create archives, mark anniversaries, protect historic localities, and save things generally because memory has been truncated.
The range of things preserved has also expanded. Our predecessors saved only grand heroic treasures; today everythingthe typical as well as the unique, the neighborly and the exotic, the relics of the wicked as well as those of the goodis saved for many new motives.
Among these are a cult of the representative, ascribing merit to things typical of their time; a cult of thefolk, seeking reminders of unsung masses who left few artifacts and no written words; a cult of the familiar and the recent, as tokens of continuity against obsolescence and dislocation, that makes 1930s linoleum and 1950s toasters as collectable as Georgian tea caddies; a cult of escape from a soulless, monotonous, or fearsome present, a perennial nostalgia now given added edge by the placeless sameness of global goods and the grim austerities of much modern architecture; a cult of economic gain, that ranges from conserving energy and materials to pandering to tourism. I do not decry material preservation. Its benefits are manifold. It endears the familiar, reaffirms purpose, validates custom, enhances identity; it guides, enriches, and diversifies life. But it also exacts costs and engenders problems. And material preservation virtually excludes other ways of valuing tradition. Before exploring some alternative modes of appreciating our legacy from the past, let us look at some of the contradictions inherent in material preservation. 
David Hume, A Treatise of

CONTRADICTIONS OF MATERIAL PRESERVATION
Endurance in perpetuity is preservation's guiding aim. But nothing lasts forever, and however faithfully protected, everything always departs more and more from its original state. Indeed, for all preservation's emphasis on original substance, we identify and cherish most things for their form or genetic continuity, not for the stuff they are made of. Though erosion and accretion ceaselessly transform them, a building or pair of shoes remains that building or those shoes from the moment of their making until the building falls into rubble, the shoes into rubbish. Living things likewise keep their identity despite obvious development and physical change. "An oak, that grows from a small plant to a large tree, is still the same oak," as Hume put it, "tho' there be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the same."' Preservationists have done little to resolve the dilemma Plutarch made famous to philosophy as the "ship of Theseus." Brought into port for repairs, every old plank in Theseus's ship was replaced by new planks. Was it still the original ship? Brian Smart's variant sharpens the issue: a builder commissioned to supply two ships, an old one restored to seaworthiness and a new one made of old materials, sees a way of selling the two ships for the cost of one. In drydock A, each old board of Theseus's ship is replaced by a new one, until the entire ship is refurbished. Meanwhile, each old plank is put into a new frame at adjoining drydock B. When a fire destroys drydock B, both buyers sue for the delivery of the original ship; but which one is it? On the grounds that identity inheres in an object's continuing form, not in its fragmentary and ephemeral substances, the court ultimately awards possession to the buyer of the surviving ship at drydock A. Each new plank in it has at once become part of the old ship, while the old plank it replaced forms part of the new ship just coming into being. Being a part of Theseus's old ship was only a temporary phase in the lifetime career of the old planks. Does the importance of the original historical treasure lie in its identity as a boat or in its being a collection of planks?2 Material substances may help to authenticate an object's provenance, but it is genetic properties (maker, period, history) that distinguish authentic from fake or replica objects of art and nature alike. A child values a teddy bear because they share a history of interaction; only the teddy bear he has always cuddled will satisfy him, not even a molecule-by-molecule reproduction will do.3 The worth of what we preserve depends ultimately on the various and sometimes conflicting intentions of its creators and subsequent guardians and restorers.
Material preservation is thus at bottom an illusion. Felt historical continuity takes precedence over strict material authenticity, which is itself impossible to achieve or sustain. What matters in preservation may be continuity of form, of substance, of texture, of color, or whatever. And because material objects are continuously transformed, every stage in preservation forces choices among these many valid but irreconcilable criteria. No preservation decision is logically right, let alone permanently appropriate.4
Another difficulty of material preservation is the stress engendered by multiple claimants. Relics and monuments are treasured not only by the cultures that created them and the states that now possess them, but also by individuals, by other localities, and by the world as a whole. The Parthenon is precious not only to Greeks in general and Athenians in particular, but to all admirers of classical culture; Jerusalem is sacred alike to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. But a material relic can be in only one place at a time.
Competition may enhance preservation worth. But the more widely valued such objects are, the more fraught the struggle to possess them -and the more prone they are to theft and vandalism, as assaults on the Louvre's Mona Lisa and the National Gallery's Virgin of the Rocks attest. Indeed, scarcity value promotes destruction, as with Mayan temples cut up for illicit export. The avid appetite for antiquities undermines their protection in situ, in context, and in their integral wholeness.
The threat of loss to a supposed rival has, to be sure, spurred heritage consciousness into preservation action. The precursor of the French antiquities service came into being following real (though unfounded) fears lest British antiquarians transport neglected Norman monastic ruins across the Channel. The Netherlands' monuments agency was born out of scandalized reactions to a British museum's purchase of a hitherto little regarded sixteenthcentury Dutch rood-screen. The felt need to forestall the transatlantic export of Tattershall Castle put teeth in the British Ancient Monuments Act of 1913.5 But the felicitous results of rivalry are outweighed by its ill consequences: the whiplash between sudden inflation and speedy decline of interest; the mercenary nimbus or patriotic penumbra that obscures aesthetic, pedagogic, and historical values; the time and energy spent, the enduring bitterness engendered in squabbles over possession. Whatever decision is reached, there can be only one winner and there will be many losers.
Even when location is not at issue, guardianship and access may embroil rival celebrants. Stonehenge is a case in point. To preserve the monument, to pacify local landowners, and to cater to a seemlier tourist clientele, English Heritage and the National Trust, which "own" the prehistoric stones and the land they sit on, in 1985 banned the customary annual solstice visits of hippies and of Druids; the result was armed combat with many casualties. Only on one point are all parties agreed: to relieve the pressure by constructing replicas would be fruitless folly, for there can be only one meaningful Stonehenge. Fame and need may spur demand for this or that material relic, but materiality itself inexorably limits the authentic supply.6
Preservation costs and benefits are largely unresolved, for most of its values are matters of feeling and attachment not amenable to cost-benefit analysis. Preservation sometimes saves materials and fuel, but the more that is preserved, the greater the effort required and the sacrifice of new construction foregone. Preserved structures and milieus may defray some costs through visitor receipts, but thereby write off other economic choices and incur other social costs. In any case, only a small fraction of what is preserved pays for itself through tourism. Ultimately one cannot keep the nineteenth let alone earlier centuries without paying for it in the twentieth.7
The cost of preservation transcends repair and maintenance charges. Saving old things runs counter to the very spirit of modern enterprise. In Britain today many fear the cult of preservation may create a nation valued only as a relic. They are leery of becoming full-time purveyors of their past, quaint old codgers in a fairy-tale historyland. "Tourism reduces all nations to Ruritania," warns a critic. "It encourages their citizens to become hucksters and grovelers after tips."8 Preservation is charged not only with preventing progress but inducing moral and social decay. Gentrified villages conserve old houses only by destroying the old community. Restoration block-busting in quaint old American neighborhoods typically displaces lowincome residents. It is still mainly the rich who wish to save old buildingsand get grants or tax benefits for doing so.
Others censure preservation for crippling initiative. Americans felt this burden of the past long before preservation became practice. "All towns should be made capable of purification by fire, or of decay within each half-century," wrote Hawthorne in a typical tirade against the old. "Otherwise, they become the hereditary haunts of vermin and noisomeness, besides standing apart from the possibility of... improvements."9 This complaint was soon leveled against preservation, and not only by Americans. "We cannot allow our lives to become overburdened and crushed down by the mere accumulation of the dead things of the past," said a member of Parliament in 1878. 0 A modem director of the Victoria and Albert Museum echoes the point. "Worship of the past and what it has created has been taken to an extreme unknown to any previous century... Nothing is deader than dead heritage and there is too much dead heritage around. The past has swallowed us up." 1 Preserving architecture is particularly felt to inhibit creativity, to foreclose the future. Old buildings pre-empt talent as well as space; regard for antiquity stifles innovation. "If we let the paranoid preservers manoeuvre us into keeping everything," charges an architectural historian, "we shall bring the normal life-process of decay and replacement to a halt, we shall straightjacket ourselves in embalmed cities of the past."12 Had preservation so ruled in the past, structures now thought splendid or sacrosanct would never have been built. "Conservationists rob us of our cultural self-confidence," runs a typical indictment. "We can no longer create, construct, imagine something new. We have to conserve, preserve, restore."13 These complaints may exaggerate preservation's influence, but they reflect pervasive misgivings about attachment to relics.
Preservation also segregates the past. Salvage encumbers the landscape with artifacts that no longer attest to a living antiquity but celebrate what is dead, replacing traditional stream-oftime continuity with a separable and salable past. Museums expressly aim to sequester relics so as to save and display them. But outside the museum, survivals adapted to new uses are also apt to be set apart from present-day things; their anachronisms are highlighted, their antiqueness is emphasized, the obsolescence of the original use is underscored.
Museum perspectives suffuse preservation work, for we tend to "see our historic towns as 'pictures' somehow divorced from the reality of everyday life," in a planner's words. 14 Seen from this perspective, preservation actually underscores our freedom from antiquity. Our very eagerness to save its vestiges shows how much we have overcome it. The vogue for preservation reflects the victory of the modern. Relics are enjoyed all the more because they matter so little; it is their felt remoteness, their lack of consequence for the present, that lends preserved things much of their charm.
Setting preserved things apart forecloses other ways of using them. Such remnants seldom inspire new creation; they are valued as sacred relics, not for how we might reshape them. We protect ancient structures rather than make new ones after their example. Unable to use the past creatively, we further isolate what we preserve; what we make may conform with treasured relics but seldom extends their virtues; what we save is property and artifacts rather than ideas or culture.
Is material preservation our only option? What else might secure the benefits we associate with it? Can the difficulties I have sketched be avoided or mitigated by putting less emphasis on material preservation or perhaps forswearing it altogether? Three modes of action, customary in some societies but not now common in our own, suggest alternative ways of coming to terms with a legacy. it recalls what it came from, forming a bond between past and present in a way a whole does not, or does only when we recognize it as a "fragment" of the world that was. Such recognition enables us imaginatively to reconstruct the past. In the ninth-century poet Li Ho's "Song of an Arrowhead from the Battlefield of Ch'ang-p'ing," a wanderer contemplates the commingled debris -"Char of lacquer, powder of bone ... three-spined, broken wolfs fang"left by the carnage. The encrusted lump he holds "clearly was something but... now has no form, category, or definition ... char or ash, something that remains after burning; powder of bone, relics of death,... the physical survivor that recalls a shattering and a dissolution." Fragments not only reveal what is missing, ghost presences of their past, they also refer to their rediscovery. Thus the fragment implies "the history of both its deposit and its recovery." Implicating so many surrounding realms, the fragment is invested with "repleteness and intensity."20
The function of fragments in dynastic China parallels their role in the Renaissance. Humanists regarded bringing together fragments of ancient buried texts as a laudable act of healing, recalling the heroic career of Hippolytus. Resurrected fragments became nutriments for new metamorphoses. And in restoring the fullness of the past the humanist reassembled himself as well, reconstituting out of the fragments of his own memory, his own history, an identity that combined an old consciousness with a new one. Such resurrection demanded not simply the rebirth but the replacement of the past, for "the dead must be devoured and digested before new life can ensue."21 In organizing fragments, the present preserved and transmitted a reshaped past.
For the Chinese, fragments served to encapsulate and magnify the past; for the Renaissance, fragments served as vehicles for restoring and translating the past. Both preserved fragments not for their own sake but, the one to contemplate a wider inter-temporal world, and the other to reconstitute a world to be out of a world that was. In both cases, preservation was creative rather than passive.
PROCESSES
A focus on preserving fragments does not connote a reduced regard for preserving material substance; on the contrary, it implies a heightened respect for its now altered and attenuated form. Those who strive to preserve not materials but processes of manufacture honor the past not by saving traditional relics but by replicating them. The world's most renowned instance is the wooden Ise Shinto temple in Japan that has, over the past millennium, been dismantled every twenty years or so and then replaced by a faithful replica built exactly as before. When traditional construction materials are highly perishable, as in Japan, it makes sense to repeat rather than to perpetuate, to bow to the mortality of matter while aiming to secure immortality in the process of replication. 22 As prized transmitters of cultural heritage, the traditionally trained craftsmen who thus perpetuate the techniques and rituals of re-creation are themselves designated "Living National Treasures" by the Japanese government.
That things must be periodically destroyed as a prelude to their re-creation is implicit in this emphasis on process. Many societies thus combine preservation with creative emulation or even outright innovation. The use of malangan in tribal New Ireland illustrates how demolition contributes to the wellsprings of creativity and to its social functions. Traditional social interaction involves the periodic exchange and destruction of carved or woven ritual artifacts. It is not the material durability of malangan that matters, but the artifacts' family resemblances to bygone and future malangan. Only those who acquire and then destroy them gain the right to replicate their form in new malangan; the right is in abeyance as long as the previous object still exists. Thus museums and Western collectors who acquire malangan reduce the range of forms available for replication and hamper patterns of social interaction.
Among these islanders, the material destruction of previous ritual objects is part and parcel of conserving social bonds.23
Destruction and preservation are, in the most profound sense, bound up in a cyclical process. A story by David Ely describes Britain after it has been destroyed in a nuclear accident. The massive effort of total restoration has had the useful corollary of reducing international tensions. Perhaps "the vaporization of Britain was logically necessary," muses an expert, "to express the dual impulse of our agevast devastation coupled with equally vast reconstruction." Other social benefits also ensue. To "ease the population pressure and provide a harmless outlet for human energy both at the same time," he concludes, "ultimately it may become desirable to vaporize and then restore one nation every generation."24 Where living entities are at stake, preservation must concern process rather than substance. All organisms are mortal; little is to be gained by prolonging any life much beyond its natural span. Once it is dead, neither mummification nor taxidermy can preserve what was most valued in the living creature. Nature preservation efforts hence focus on species, on aggregates rather than individuals. As with malangan, it is the ongoing process that counts, not any substance (unless one considers a gene pool to be a substance). To some biologists even species preservation seems fruitless, since extinction is in any case the ultimate fate of most if not all species. What these scientists consider worth preserving is not species but ecosystems, which may be unique assemblages but are in no sense individual entities. And some biologists would protect neither species nor ecosystems, but only whatever biosphere conditions maintain evolutionary processes. For evolution continually replaces species and ecosystem losses with new realms of living organisms that are no less diverse and adaptable. 25 REPRESENTATIONS Fragments and processes offer more flexible alternatives to preserving material objects in toto. In fact, the Chinese ideal discourages material possession as a burdensome, imprisoning vice. To amass, classify, house, and protect art objects and other relics reduces creation to commodity, demeaning both object and owner. Only the loss and ultimate dissolution of those objects can rectify the psychic damage their possession has inflicted.26
Images of the past, whether preserved in paint or print or simply as memories in the mind's eye, may serve as adequate surrogates for original material entities, and on occasion offer a heritage in many respects
How material possession degenerates into a lust for acquisition and into dehumanized hoarding is the lesson of Li Ch'ing-chao's "Afterword" to her dead husband's monumental study of epigraphy, written in 1132. Chao Te-fu shared with his wife a love of antiquitiesold books, rubbings of inscriptions, calligraphy. For the pleasure of acquiring some treasured item, they lived in cheerful frugality, even pawning their clothes for a painting or calligraphic work, "chewing over" old writings and antiquities in companionable contentment.
As Chao Te-fu's career as a provincial official prospered, their collection grew. Items were classified, organized, put in perfect condition, to the point where they required a separate wing in the house, now so valuable they had to be kept under lock and key; to gain access to it, Li Ch'ing-chao herself had to ask her husband's permission. "From a connoisseurship of knowledge and appreciation, we have moved to an almost mercantile connoisseurship of possession"; now it was no longer what was in the work that counted, but "the work as object," in Stephen Owen's gloss on this tale. "The transformation of books and art into objects is part of a system of possession, which in controlling, organizing, ranking, regulating, and locking things away, corrupts a genuine relationship to the past, just as it corrupts the relations between human beings in the present"for Li Ch'ing-chao now learns that she, too, is valued mainly in relation to the collection.
As Tartar invasions threaten the collection with scattering and destruction, Chao Te-fu sets up a hierarchy of worth to save as much as possible. And the collection shows its ugly face, not as knowledge and pleasure but as a mass of objects that enslave their owners. As the wife transports the more precious moiety to supposed safety, her husband reminds her of the order in which she must save things: "abandon the household goods first, then the clothes, then the books and scrolls, then the old bronzesbut carry the sacrificial vessels for the ancestral temple yourself; live or die with them; don't give them up." Thus, writes Owen, "she too has her place in the cataloguealong with the sacrificial vessels, the last to go," commanded by ticity until Rogalla realizes that his relics will never be allowed to attest historical truth. In despair, he at length sets fire to the lot, so as to "bring the collected witnesses to our past into safety, a final, irrevocable safety, from which they ... could never again be exploited for this cause or that." Originally preserved so as to bear witness to the realities of the past against the violations of the present, Rogalla's heritage collection finally succumbs to the very corruptions its retention was meant to prevent. Better no material witnesses at all, Lenz warns us, than relics that can so readily be turned into lies.28
To be sure, immaterial witnesses to the past are no less malleable. Current recall can warp memories even more easily than physical relics. But immateriality exempts them from most corruptions that possessiveness and commodity market greed engender, and spares them the pretenses that cloak material remains with a spurious validity.
Wang Xizhi wrote his archetypal calligraphic "Preface of the Orchard Pavilion" to mark a day of festival during a spring ritual in the fourth century. Instantly famous, "Orchard Pavilion" was copied again and again. The seventh-century Emperor Tang Taizong avidly collected these copies and was reputed ultimately to have acquired the original. Buried with the emperor in 649, the original "Orchard Pavilion" has not since been seen. But it has been continually copied, with new stone tablets carved from copies, then new rubbings taken from the stones; the pedigree of these copies of copies of copies is itself a complex, arcane discipline. Some five centuries later, "Orchard Pavilion" gained still greater influence through another calligrapher of genius, Mi Fu, whose own creations based on Wang's style became famous. But few "pure" exemplars even of Mi Fu by now remain. In the famous old city of Soochow there are no ancient ruins. "We in the West tend to equate the antique presence with authentically ancient physical objects" observes a Sinologist. "China has no ruins comparable to the Roman Forum, or even to Angkor Wat," not because the Chinese were unable to build with hewn stone, "but because of a different attitude about how to achieve an enduring monument." Ancient cities such as Soochow became repositories of the past by embodying or suggesting associations whose value lay beyond the material realm:
"The past was a past of words, not of stones." China did not feel "its history as violated or abused when the historic monuments collapsed or burned, as long as these could be replaced or restored and their functions regained.... The real past of Soochow is a past of the mind; its imperishable elements are moments of human experience."
Soochow's Maple Bridge is a famous topic in Chinese literary history. But the bridge has little importance as an object. "No single poem refers ... to its physical presence;... its reality to them was not the stones forming the span" but its associations realized in words. Men achieve immortality not by building imperishable stone monuments but by cultivating their capacities to express themselves in imperishable words or by the act of revering someone else's enduring thoughts. 31
CONCLUSION
Preservation is an impulse innate to life. But our need to preserve coexists with a no less urgent need to innovate. Preservation's extension into widening realms of nature and culture threatens to upset delicate balances between saving and changing, balances crucial to individuals and to social groups alike. The alternatives to material preservation described above are not options freely open to modem Western culture. Preferring fragments to wholes, processes to material entities, written or painted or mental images to physical objects, all imply perspectives on the past, on the present, and on life in general that are quite unlike our own. They are modes of behavior that are enacted only by dint of long immersion within congruent cultural features; they are patterns that derive from habit, not from deliberate adoption. We make our past, as Marx said, but we do not make it just as we choose: we are constrained by cultural circumstance, over which we have little control. 32 So too with modes of preservation: we may study how alternative commitments operate with an eye to re-examining our own, but not with a view to seeking substitutes for them.
Culture and circumstance enforce our commitment to material preservation. Nonetheless, awareness of other cultures' different modes of defining and preserving pasts useful to them may help us to extend the forms and functions of material preservation. Re-using artifacts in ways that transcend pure museumization, on the one hand, and purely contemporary utility, on the other, offers one engaging prospect. Preservation today is normally polarized between idealized pasts that are wholly antiquarian and those that are wholly usable, to the caricaturing detriment of both extremes. Preservation advocates should realize that most preserved objects occupy places along a continuum between these extremes, in some measure subserving the interests of both immediate utility and long-term heritage.
To confine consideration of preservation only to our own narrow traditions disserves the treasures and diminishes the pleasures the past has left us to enjoy. It should be remembered that preservation is only a means to an end; when it becomes an end in itself it ceases to advance its prime functions of use, of instruction, of delight.
Whatever may be its authentic etymology, "preserve" also carries with it the meaning of "pre-serve." It is an act that preceded some aim to be served through it. Preservation is not action or epilogue; it is only prologue.
David Lowenthal
